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RECENT WORK

THE MINIMAL DEFINITION AND METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY:
A REPORT FROM A CONFERENCE
STEPHEN C. ANGLE

In June of 2008, the International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western
Philosophy (ISCWP) convened its third Constructive Engagement conference, on the theme of
“Comparative Philosophy Methodology.” During the opening speeches, Prof. Dunhua ZHAO,
Chair of the Philosophy Department at Peking University, challenged the conference’s
participants to put forward a minimal definition of “comparative philosophy” and a statement
of its methods. Based on the papers from the conference and the extensive discussion that
ensued, during my closing reflections at the end of the conference I offered a tentative
synthesis of the conference’s conclusions. That summary has already been published on-line as
part of the bi-annual ISCWP newsletter (Angle 2008). In this brief essay, I recapitulate the
themes of my earlier summary and expand, in my own voice, on some of the key points.

An important goal of the conference was to bring together both practitioners and critics
of comparative philosophy, in its various incarnations, to reflect on and debate the
nature of our subject. There was thus no expectation that we would all agree perfectly
on what “comparative philosophy” is, and on how it should be done. However, we did
discover that there was considerable agreement. Most basically, it became clear that
comparative philosophy has at least two potential dimensions that, while they may
interact, are at least sometimes distinct from one another:
1. Use terms, ideas, or concepts from one philosophical tradition to help
understand or interpret another philosophical tradition.
2. Through cross-tradition engagement, seek to advance or develop philosophy.
Depending on how one defines “philosophy,” often the “traditions” in question will not
be only philosophical. Both historically and at the present moment, “Confucianism”
surely can refer to many discourses and practices that are not in any obvious way
philosophical. Almost all the conference participants agreed, though, that historical and
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more recent Confucian practice has included an important philosophical dimension,
and thus that one can treat the tradition as philosophy for the purposes of comparative
philosophy.
Not all participants agreed that comparative philosophy could successfully
accomplish these goals; I will discuss in a moment some of the challenges that were
articulated. In general, though, we thought that the goals could be met, and articulated
some success conditions:
1. Success comes in either of the above dimensions when the work is constructive.
2. Many of us agreed that success — and constructiveness — must be measured in
context. That is, what counts as an “advance” will be determined from within a
given philosophical tradition, rather than from a neutral standpoint above or
between traditions.
3. Some of us believed that it was possible to judge which idea or tradition was
better overall, at least in some circumstances. None of us believed that one
could readily judge which tradition was the absolute best.
Alasdair MacIntyre is well-known for having argued that, notwithstanding the
existence of a kind of incommensurability (on which see further below), it is
sometimes possible to compare two traditions and see which one is superior
(MacIntyre 1988). He argues that one might come to see that one’s tradition has failed
by its own lights, and furthermore that an alternative tradition can both explain this
failure, and does not itself fail by its own lights. In such a case it can be rational,
MacIntyre says, to adopt the alternative tradition. MacIntyre offers various possible
examples, and it can also be interesting to think about Chinese advocates of “complete
Westernization” in the early twentieth century in this vein. Still, even in such cases, the
judgment of superiority is still made from a particular standpoint that is initially rooted
in one of the two traditions.
If we set aside the type of case MacIntyre has in mind, then the only possible
success criteria would seem to be internal notions of progress or fruitfulness, on the
one hand, and a standpoint-independent idea of universal truth, on the other. In fact, if
we grant that the only access one has to truth is via the best epistemological standards
that one has so far come up with, then standpoint-independent truth will collapse into
internal judgments. Therefore we seem to be on solid ground in emphasizing that
success in comparative philosophy — the “constructive” kind of engagement that is
referred to in the title of the conference series — is judged from within the distinct
perspectives that the comparative philosopher is bringing into contact. One need not be
limited to only one of the perspectives. In an essay a few years ago in comparative
political philosophy, for example, I argued that if Chinese democratic centralism were
to undergo certain sorts of reforms, it would then be legitimate both in its own terms,
and from the standpoint of a Rawlsian “Law of Peoples” (Angle 2005). The exact
significance of this result varies, depending on one’s own position; I did not offer
either perspective as uniquely privileged.
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Depending on the nature of the philosophical work, the ways in which its
“constructiveness” might be evaluated will also vary. Current debates about the
applicability of the category “virtue ethics” to early Confucianism can illustrate some
of the complexities. For some (e.g., Van Norden 2007), the framework of virtue ethics
can help us better interpret and understand a work like the Meng-Zi. Others have
argued that this category highlights relatively unimportant aspects of the text, and leads
to a misunderstanding of its actual significance in its day. Whether a “virtue ethics”
approach to the Meng-Zi is constructive as regards textual understanding — the first
dimension of comparative philosophy mentioned above — will depend in part on the
outcome of debates like these. (It will also depend on the details of what a given
scholar takes “virtue ethics” to be, since this very category is by no means univocal in
current philosophical use.) If we turn to the second (“advance or develop”) dimension,
we see that constructiveness will be judged by whether some version of Confucianismas-virtue-ethics is judged to be a fruitful development of Confucianism, as seen either
by someone committed to the contemporary development of Confucianism as a living
philosophical tradition, or by someone interested in the development of virtue ethics in
ever more robust, explanatory, or transformative ways.
Participants in the conference identified a series of challenges to comparative
philosophy:
1. Incommensurability. If it is impossible to compare or translate, then
comparative philosophy cannot succeed.
2. Some say that philosophy is simply one thing; there is no room for
“comparison.”
3. A complementary worry is that different philosophical traditions lack adequate
common concerns.
4. Research and teaching of comparative philosophy lacks adequate institutional
support and potential students find it difficult to acquire the needed training. On
this we were all in agreement.
With respect to incommensurability, most of us at the conference believed that
differences between concepts or languages or traditions did not make comparison
impossible. Both theoretical reasons (e.g., Donald Davidson’s argument in Davidson
1984) and practical examples (of seemingly successful comparative philosophy) were
offered as evidence that this challenge could be overcome. My own view (as seen, for
example, in Angle 2002) is that there is ample evidence of cross-tradition philosophical
engagement despite the distinctiveness of each tradition, and that we can readily
understand how such communication across differences can occur. Indeed, according
to many plausible theories of linguistic meaning, communication across difference
takes place even when two native speakers of the “same language” talk to one another.
Concerning the idea that “philosophy” is one specific thing, leaving no room for
comparison, we should acknowledge that if philosophy is defined very narrowly, it
may be that there is not enough room for the level of different development on which
the possibility of comparative philosophy depends. Few of us were convinced that
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philosophy is such a narrow enterprise, however. Efforts to produce a narrow definition
based on early Greek “philosophia” are typically extremely ahistorical — ignoring, for
example, the evidence that philosophy was understood as a “way of life” (Hadot 1995).
Turning to the opposite worry, that different philosophical traditions may lack common
concerns, the most basic response is simply that many scholars have in fact found areas
of common concern in our work across traditions, and those of us at the conference
were therefore skeptical of any a priori argument that denied we could have done this.
“Common concern” does not, of course, necessitate finding identical formulations of
concepts or problems; this thought returns us to the same considerations that were
discussed in the previous paragraph.
The challenge of inadequate institutional support, we agreed, applies to each of our
countries. Pioneering comparative philosophers in China, as in the U.S., have certainly
had an impact, and there are now some institutional structures that welcome and
nurture comparative research. But many barriers remain. In China, it is often difficult
to be simultaneously taken seriously by specialists in different traditions, even when
they share a single department. In the U.S., specialists in traditions other than the
dominant Western ones are extremely rare within major graduate departments, as has
recently been discussed in an issue of the APA’s Newsletter on Asian and AsianAmerican Philosophers and Philosophies (Olberding 2008). We have a long way to go.
Finally, on the basis of this understanding of comparative philosophy, what could
we say about its methodology? At the conference there was quite general agreement on
the following characteristics of a minimal methodology:
1. Openness is fundamental, though so is the exercise of critical philosophical
judgment.
2. Traditions are not monolithic, but internally diverse; our specific methods
should take advantage of this.
3. The idea of family resemblance is very helpful.
4. A focus on concepts or problems is often more constructive than the
comparison of individual thinkers, though there are many exceptions —
particularly if the figure studied was him or herself engaged in comparative
work.
5. Careful attention to issues of language and grammar is important.
6. Adequate training and adequate institutional support is critical.
There is of course a great deal that could be said about many of these characteristics,
but the key is to stress that the “minimal” nature of the methodology does not mean
that we each felt that a more “maximal” set of principles was needed, but could not
agree on such principles. A few at the conference did indeed argue for a more
demanding methodology which they felt entailed constructing a kind of neutrality
among traditions or a perspectiveless perspective. In general the conference
participants were not sympathetic to such an approach, and noted that some of those
who advocated such an understanding of comparative philosophy did so in order to
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argue that the enterprise was impossible. Most of us felt this was attacking a straw
man.
The general preference for a “minimal” methodology, therefore, does not express a
compromise or a lowest common denominator. Admittedly, because comparative
philosophical practice is diverse, this limits the number of helpful generalizations about
methodology that can be made. Nonetheless, I feel that the conference’s agreed-upon
methodological principles are far from empty. The idea of openness, in particular, puts
the comparative enterprise into tension with many existing research programs in
philosophy that are narrowly constrained by explicit or implict assumptions about their
subject matters. Still, some at the conference commented on the minimal methodology
by suggesting that there was no real difference between doing what is here
characterized as “comparative philosophy” and simply doing philosophy well. This
may be true: perhaps all philosophy is comparative philosophy.
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